Perceptions of the processes of radicalisation and de-radicalisation among British South Asian Muslims in a post-industrial city more

This article was downloaded by: [Fatin University] On: 18 May 2012, At: 00:57 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/csid20 Perceptions of the processes of radicalisation and de-radicalisation among British South Asian Muslims in a post-industrial city Tahir Abbas & Assma Siddique a b a b Department of Sociology, Fatih University, Istanbul, Turkey Birmingham Metropolitan College, Birmingham, UK Available online: 09 Dec 2011 To cite this article: Tahir Abbas & Assma Siddique (2012): Perceptions of the processes of radicalisation and de-radicalisation among British South Asian Muslims in a post-industrial city, Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture, 18:1, 119-134 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2011.629519 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-andconditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. 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The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. Social Identities Vol. 18, No. 1, January 2012, 119Á134 Perceptions of the processes of radicalisation and de-radicalisation among British South Asian Muslims in a post-industrial city Tahir Abbasa* and Assma Siddiqueb a Department of Sociology, Fatih University, Istanbul, Turkey; bBirmingham Metropolitan College, Birmingham, UK (Received 14 December 2009; final version received 9 May 2011) This paper presents the findings of a qualitative study exploring the perceptions of British South Asian Muslims in relation to the pathways towards radicalisation and the challenges of community leadership in relation to de-radicalisation. The study is based on in-depth interviews, using an ethnographic methodological framework, with a purposive sample of 30 Muslim men and women, including senior political figures, community leaders, religious figures and young Muslims (aged 18Á25) from across the city of Birmingham, UK. The fieldwork was carried out between September 2005 and May 2007. Respondents reflected a general perspective that regards social exclusion, Islamophobia, lack of effective theological and political leadership, regressive anti-terror law and geo-political events as principal factors in the radicalisation and the de-radicalisation of British Muslims. These findings provide important insights into Muslims in Britain in relation to questions of ‘radicalism’ and politics, and they have specific implications for research, policy and practice in this area. Keywords: Birmingham (UK); radicalisation; Muslims; Islamism; extremism; cohesion; leadership Downloaded by [Fatin University] at 00:57 18 May 2012 Introduction On 7 July 2005, four bombs exploded in London, killing 52 people and leaving many hundreds injured and traumatised. The fact that these attacks were carried out by four young British-born Muslim men was especially disconcerting. While there has been considerable media attention in relation to this event, academic literature is limited with thin policy and official reporting coupled with much populist social commentary and analysis dominating the profile. This paper discusses issues of radicalisation, political participation and the spiritual leadership of the Muslim community and its impact on British Muslims as seen by South Asian Muslim respondents of different generations, classes and genders in the context of Britain’s multi-ethnic post-industrial global second city, Birmingham. First, a brief description of the city’s socio-demographic characteristics and an overview of the government’s Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) agenda are provided. Second, the methodology of the study is presented, highlighting how the samples were determined and the strengths and limitations of the approaches taken. Third, the analysis explores the particular issues in relation to the pathways to radicalisation *Corresponding author. Email: tahir_abbas@hotmail.co.uk ISSN 1350-4630 print/ISSN 1363-0296 online # 2012 Taylor & Francis http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2011.629519 http://www.tandfonline.com 120 T. Abbas & A. Siddique and the importance of leadership as part of the solution. Discrete and significant areas of research and discussion in their own right, here they form part of a more holistic perspective on the nature of a community in the context of a city in rapid flux. In conclusion, it is argued that the nature of radicalism in Britain is more a function of socio-economic, political and criminological factors rather than it having anything specifically to do with the disposition of Islam itself. It is clear that effective political participation and representation are important opportunities to help act as a solution to the challenges of violent extremism. The findings have important ramifications for social thinkers and policy-makers working in this area. Birmingham South Asian Muslims: Migration and demographic context In the post-war period, British South Asian Muslims, who came to work in declining manufacturing industries, found themselves located in textile towns and other heavy engineering regions in the North, the Midlands and the South East. These South Asian Muslims were relatively absent in the service sector economy and in newer industrial settlements (Anwar, 1979). In the city of Birmingham, Muslim groups initially settled in the ‘zones of transition’, which were being vacated by mobile Britons in ‘white flight’. Subsequently, these areas became disadvantaged with new employment created elsewhere and in other economic sectors (Rex & Moore, 1967; Chan, 2006). Presently, many South Asian Muslim minorities in Birmingham are concentrated in various inner city areas, forming the ‘middle ring’ (Rex & Tomlinson, 1979), and in particular around inter-cultural and inter-ethnic relations to this day (Karner & Parker, 2011). The 1991 Census demonstrated that second and third generation South Asian Muslims were inclined to live in the same geographical locations as parents (Phillips, 1998). Robinson (1993) argued that this is because the youth wish to continue the religious and cultural traditions of past generations as well as a result of the current negative experiences found in the labour market (Open Society Institute, 2004; Peach, 2006). In the 2001 Census, the religion question was asked for the first time since 1850. It was a voluntary question and 92% of the national population provided a response. Muslims accounted for 14.3% of the city’s population (140,000) out of a total population of 1 million. This number was the seventh highest Muslim population concentration in a British town or city, and twice as large as the single highest concentration of Muslims outside of London. In April 2001, 9% of the 1.6 million Muslims in the UK and 16% of Britain’s entire Pakistani population of 658,000 were found to be in the city of Birmingham (Birmingham City Council, 2003; ONS, 2005). Although the vast majority of Birmingham’s 140,000 Muslims are defined as Pakistani (74%) these ‘Pakistanis’ in Birmingham predominantly emanate from the Mirpur district of Azad Kashmir and the surrounding areas, including Attock, Jhelum and Rawalpindi. A number of British Pakistanis also originate from districts in Northern Punjab (Pakistan), but have largely settled in the de-industrialised inner cities to the North (Werbner, 1990), or in the South East of England (Shaw, 2000). Many of these Birmingham Pakistanis are also ethnically Pathan or linguistically Pashtun in origin. In the immediate post-war era, South Asians and African-Caribbeans from former New Commonwealth countries came to the ‘motherland’ in search of work and better opportunities. In recent periods it has been groups from Eastern Europe, the Middle East and West Africa who have migrated to the city of Birmingham. In particular, over the last five years, Somali Downloaded by [Fatin University] at 00:57 18 May 2012 Social Identities 121 Downloaded by [Fatin University] at 00:57 18 May 2012 groups have come to Birmingham via sojourns in the Netherlands, Denmark or Sweden. They number approximately 40,000 people (unofficially) and are of variously different generations, genders and tribal allegiances. Furthermore, there are approximately 4Á5,000 Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees who live in Birmingham, the vast majority from Iraq. Birmingham has also become home to many young Iranians (Birmingham City Council, 2003; Dick, 2004). In general, these new Muslim groups have settled in parts of the city where the current second and third generation South Asian Muslim groups are generally still found. The majority of South Asians Muslims in Birmingham are of a Sufi Barelwi origin, which is part of the Hanifi school of Islam dominant in South Asia. The challenges experienced by the people of the city of Birmingham are not atypical of many faced by Muslims in other localities in Britain. Presently, approximately one in five of the city’s inhabitants are Muslim and this proportion is growing, but the male unemployment rate is three times that of the overall city levels. It is not surprising that these Muslims have low levels of engagement when it comes to state-driven initiatives, and reflect a tendency to meet their needs through self-sufficiency, a strategy which has so far proved less effective. At the same time, the development of certain trends in separatism and extremism among some minority sections of the Muslim community could further increase the marginalisation of this community, and contribute to even more tension and potentially lead to further conflict. In the context of growing economic and social inequality, global instability and lower levels of trust in state services, South Asian Muslims in inner city areas are particularly vulnerable. Preventing violent extremism In relation to government policy, as a response to the events of 7/7 and the number of terror plots foiled since then, local authorities across the country were given the essential function of strengthening communities through Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE). This operates under the remit of the PREVENT (challenging, disrupting, supporting individuals; increasing the resilience of communities to violent extremism; and addressing the grievances) strand of the government’s counterterrorism strategy (CONTEST; pursue, prepare, protect and prevent). Accountability for PREVENT lies with the Home Office and Communities and Local Government (CLG), with the primary aim ‘to prevent people becoming or supporting terrorists or violent extremists’. In 2006, the PVE Pathfinder fund was launched by the CLG to assist local authorities to develop appropriate activities and strategies to tackle issues of violent extremism at the local area level (Communities & Local Government, 2007b). This threat is regarded as a significant issue in relation to de-limiting Al-Qaida-inspired Islamic political radicalism (although it is framed within the context of the struggle of a small number of alienated minorities). The threat is seen to have global reach with local area impacts. In this context, the government initiated a programme of activities to focus on issues of identity and cultural values. In particular, it is mosque capacity, faith leaders and developing the resilience of community organisations that are at the heart of the specific interests of government. In 2007Á2008, government made available the sum of £6m to support around 70 local authorities in their delivery of pathfinder initiatives (Communities & Local Government, 2007a; UK Government, 2008a, 2008b), of which Birmingham received Á the UK government agenda 122 T. Abbas & A. Siddique Downloaded by [Fatin University] at 00:57 18 May 2012 £525,000. It subsequently gained around £1.3 million in funds over the three-year period that followed. Understanding of and engagement with Muslim communities remains an important evaluative tool in relation to the abilities of local partners to effectively appreciate the extent of their knowledge base and the processes through which that understanding is translated into action. It is apparent that much effort is made in relation to finding local area solutions to what are deemed as local area problems but, ultimately, the problems of radicalism are indeed political and international and therefore the solutions can only be at that level. Arguably, capacity-building and empowerment of Muslim minority communities will increase the potential to help theological and cultural resilience, but will they have any impact on political empowerment on their own? A focus on local issues suggests that the factors of socio-economic and cultural exclusion have had a negative impact on some young Muslims, especially men. Many young Muslims who live in poorer inner city areas are underachieving in educational spheres. This results in many unable to participate in mainstream British society as effective economic and cultural citizens. Since 9/11, young men emphasise that increasing Islamophobia in the media, negative policing and regressive government policy have made them feel further excluded, even vilified (see Amin, 2004; Kundnani, 2008; Abbas, 2007). There is also criticism to suggest that PVE is indeed a form of ‘community-led surveillance’ (Kundnani, 2009). In relation to the ever stronger anti-terror legislation, there are concerns over the negative impact it is having and how it may result in young people moving further towards a more radical identity politics. In particular, international issues are emphasised, with much reference made to suffering in Muslim lands and the concept of the Ummah (the notion of a global Muslim community), which has a central place in mainstream Islamic teaching and practice. All of these areas were under test as part of this study. Methodology This research was concerned with people of South Asian Muslim origin in the city of Birmingham, UK, analysing perceptions and attitudes in relation to the events of 7 July 2005, and subsequent issues that have emerged in relation to radicalism and leadership. The city was purposely chosen because of its rich and growing Muslim community, with (unofficially) one-in-five of the city’s 1 million people thought to be of Muslim origin. It is where Azad (free) Kashmiris and Pakistanis dominate a demographic profile that includes Bengalis, Indians, Yemenis, Afghans, Iraqis, Somalis, Algerians and Bosnians (Hussain, 2008). Recently, the city has also been at the centre of attention because of various high profile anti-terror raids since 2006. These have given the city a particular focus in relation to government and community approaches to dealing with problematic radical Islamic identity politics. The theoretical sample consisted of different groups within the South Asian Muslim community; including spiritual leaders, youth workers, community workers, political figures and a number of young men and women from the wider Muslim minority community of the city. Thirty in-depth interviews were conducted in total. Respondents acted as a purposive sample to reflect the demographic, social and political profile of South Asian Muslims across the city. Of the sample of 30, half were women. The research interviews were collected between September 2005 and May 2007. Access to this sample was gained through snowballing and the utilisation Social Identities 123 of professional networks. All the respondents were Pakistani ((Azad) Kashmiri, Afghan or Punjabi), Indian (including Gujarati-speaking and of East African background) or Bangladeshi (predominantly Sylheti). This sample is purposive in the sense that the aims of the study are to illustrate the range and diversity of South Asian Muslim opinion in relation to a number of debates. The responses do not reflect the entirety of attitudes among Muslims or South Asians in the city of Birmingham per se, but rather a specific group of South Asian Muslims, and one that is often in the limelight. To avoid the potential for same-ethnicity or same-religion biases the interview samples were selected across a range of ethnicities, social classes and genders (Gilligan, 1998). However, ultimately, the conceptualisations employed are less important than the actual epistemological accountability involved in making them transparent to others (Becker, 1967). Given how religious, ethnic and cultural research questions often involve complex issues of a sensitive, political or ideological nature, the wish to produce reliable social knowledge is the aim of all researchers, and predicated by the need to ensure that the appropriate methods are utilised in the appropriate way, irrespective of all else (Denzin, 1997). Nevertheless, as people of the same religion and similar ethnic identities may well be a constructive feature of the research process in relation to the development of intellectual, social and cultural norms and values, of the both researcher and researched, they are also potentially part of the ‘problems’ that might emerge: that is, the double hermeneutic. Different participant subjectivities (interviewer and interviewee) in inter-cultural interviewing are compounded by communicating across cultures and between religions (Gunaratnam, 2003; Fawcett & Hearn, 2004; Abbas, 2010). For example, one of the researchers in this project was a young Muslim woman. She encountered, and in most cases overcame, a number of difficulties with the data collection process. The main complexity was in gaining access to young men as some expressed that they were uncomfortable operating in an environment in which they were alone with a Muslim woman researcher. In these instances, a male Muslim volunteer, known to the researcher and the researched, was present during the interactions, or the interview was conducted in a wholly public space. Participants were informed of their anonymity in the research and it was explained prior to their involvement that the information collected would be used only for an academic research project. To generate rapport between the researched and researcher it was important that when the interviews were conducted, where possible, every effort was made to make the participants feel at ease in the hope that they would talk freely and confidently, speaking openly about their beliefs, opinions and values towards all aspects of the subject area. The female participants were far more at ease, not only talking to a woman but also a woman from a similar religiocultural position to them, greatly reducing the potential power imbalance between participants and the researcher. For participants in the mosques, interviews were conducted in a pre-booked room. In the wider community, interviews were conducted in a safe public space. University students were interviewed on campus and during their free time. A whole host of observations on mosques, community centres, public gatherings and based on media representations were also taken into consideration as part of a wider ethnographic study of attitudes, opinions and perceptions. Pseudonyms are used throughout. Downloaded by [Fatin University] at 00:57 18 May 2012 124 Pathways to radicalism T. Abbas & A. Siddique The term ‘radicalism’ may be associated with ‘extremism’ but it does always reflect the perceived reality (Spalek, 2007). For the purposes of this paper and in relation to a study of communities in action, the term radicalisation means when individuals use religion to justify the use or threat of serious violence. In the current context, the focus is on Muslims. In relation to its ‘Islamic political’ orientation, the rise of radicalism and the emergence of ‘Salafist’ thinking (puritanical ideology based on the ‘early generations’ of Islam) can be seen in the work of ideologues such as Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab (1703Á1792), Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838Á1897), Hassan al-Banna (1906Á1949) or Abul Ala Maududi (1903Á1979) (Esposito, 1994; Ali, 2003). Movements emerging from the philosophies of these ideologues have not only contributed to the revivalism of Islam in their own time but have left a legacy that informs much of contemporary political Islam (Esposito, 1997; Ahmed, 2003). However, the 7/7 London attacks, in particular, raised great concerns as they were not carried out by ‘foreigners’ but by four British-born Muslim youths. What made these young men, some with UK tertiary education and seemingly wellintegrated into society, resort to such violence has been explained by a number of factors, most notably the ‘war on terror’ (Rai, 2006), but also because of limitations to a religio-cultural outlook, compounded by patriarchy, inter-generational differences and limited community social infrastructures (Malik, 2007). A video released by Al-Qaida on first the anniversary of 7/7 shows one of the bombers, Shahzad Tanweer, arguing that his actions had been provoked by British foreign policy and the persecution of Muslims around the world (The Guardian, 2006). Organisations such as Al-Muhajiroun (founded by Omar Bakri Muhammad in the UK in 1996, but disbanded in October 2004) and Hizb-ut-Tahrir, aim to establish the Islamic state (Khilafah), which followers argue is a central tenant of the Muslim faith. Both groups have been criticised for promoting anti-Western messages and distributing inflammatory material against other faiths (Taji-Farouki, 1996). Nevertheless, they can gain the support of some young Muslims who feel liberated by their approach, as they transcend the ethnic, cultural and conservative attitudes prevalent in mosques and when imams (faith leaders) and committee members can often exclude ‘others’ (Hamid, 2007). Furthermore, there is a desire among second and third generation Muslims to gain a more literal interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah (the way of the Prophet), to help provide a sense of identity in an increasingly fractured world. This aspiration is exploited by radical groups, and especially where mosques and imams are poorly equipped to fulfil the religious, cultural and intellectual edification needs of young people. Wiktorowicz (2005) argues that groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Al-Muhajiroun operate in a competitive market place for those seeking religion as a political solution. There has, however, also emerged a ‘new Muslim leadership’. Those who possess the social, cultural and human capital gained through Western education and are able to utilise this to transmit Islam to the next generation while ensuring successful integration. As McLoughlin (2002) notes, this leadership is often national, not local. For Lewis (2006), the quality and confidence of this religious leadership is critical. Successful integration is dependent on a successful model of ‘British Islam’. The findings in relation to radicalism raised several points. A number of questions were asked to determine whether there was a perception of an actual Downloaded by [Fatin University] at 00:57 18 May 2012 Social Identities 125 increase in radical behaviour and, if so, the reasons behind them. The crisis currently taking place within the Muslim world, the ‘war on terror’ and the Palestinian issue were greatly focused on, as well as factors of exclusion and alienation within Britain, suggesting a prima facie general increase in support of various forms of extremism and the rejection of British culture. Before elaborating on the processes of radicalism, some respondents expressed their concerns that the use of the term ‘radicalism’ in current debates not only masks the reality but also leads to growing fears and misconceptions that there is a problem rooted in the religion rather than in the wider social and political world (Dreyfuss, 2005; Abbas, 2011). An imam said: We must be careful when using terms such as Islamic radicalism or Islamic extremism . . . because it suggests that there is problem with the religion . . . when in fact it has nothing to do with the religion but religion is used as a justification to carry out violent acts. (Mir, Pakistani (Kashmiri), imam, aged 45) Downloaded by [Fatin University] at 00:57 18 May 2012 A leading political figure added, This radical behaviour is really a response to many factors I suppose . . . a response to oppression, exclusion, racism . . . which make young people adopt a radical form of Islam as a form of resistance. (Abdullah, Pakistani (Kashmiri), political figure, aged 56) Many of the younger Muslims, both men and women, expressed that organisations such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir did not represent them or their views, but some did argue that they could understand why some youngsters would be drawn to these groups. One young woman articulated that she had attended talks which Hizb-utTahrir had organised, and argued that the messages they portray can certainly be attractive to young people because they not only offer an alternative to traditional organisations, which young people feel have failed them, but they also give support in the face of increasing Islamophobia, racism, the negative impact of geopolitical issues and social exclusion. The experience here suggests that organisations such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir are able to attract young people who feel alienated, excluded and angry about foreign policy, but this did not suggest that individuals were indeed becoming radicalised in the explicit sense: I would not say that they (Hizb-ut-Tahrir) represent my views. I just think that they provide unity. It’s like when you go to their conferences they talk about all the issues that are affecting Muslims. And it’s like . . . like you can relate to everything that they are saying. Racism, religious discrimination, what’s happening to Muslims all over the world . . . and that gives you belonging. (Irum, Pakistani (Punjabi), young woman, aged 20) An interesting point from the discussions emerged when one young woman argued that, while she did not believe that an increasing number of Muslims were heading towards a violent form of radical Islam, they may be becoming far more political, and this is usually expressed through physical appearance, such as donning the Arab Muslim garb. This outward physical manifestation of religiosity was argued to be a reflection of an inner contestation over the nature of fractured identities. It was a sign of defiance and resistance in the face of persistent negative media and political vilification. 126 T. Abbas & A. Siddique [An] increasing number of young Muslim women are wearing the Hijab (headscarf) and men are growing beards and wearing caps . . . I think that this is a form of resistance . . . to . . . racism and what they, I suppose, see as an attack on their faith. It provides a sense of identity. (Aisha, Bengali (Sylheti), young woman, aged 21) Downloaded by [Fatin University] at 00:57 18 May 2012 Moreover, this apparently greater adherence to Islam is particularly expressed among second and third generations, and it was suggested that many young Muslims did not feel the same cultural attachment and belonging to the country of origin as their parents (Samad, 2004; Cressey, 2006), but they also feel detachment and estrangement in a country in which they are a minority and continue to experience on-going social inequalities. This echoes the findings of recent studies on Muslim youths; not feeling that they belong to Pakistan, Bangladesh or Britain, the religion of Islam provides a sense of belonging and solidarity beyond that of ethnic affiliation (Jacobson, 1998; Alexander, 2000). This expression of religion in terms of physical appearance can be interpreted as a resistance strategy against racism and antiIslamic rhetoric. However, the view that Muslims were merely responding in a limited way to processes of oppression and subjugation was countered by some. The notion that young people are not always aware of the ‘middle path’ was frequently expressed. Here, respondents argued that there is an obvious danger in turning towards a more radical Islam, and this is because Islam is forced into polarisations, There are two sides: the argument on one side a sort of Western neo-con agenda and on the other side the extremist Islamic agenda and young people are made to feel that there is no middle ground. (Yahya, Pakistani (Kashmiri), imam, aged 38) These dichotomies result in young people feeling the need to draw on politically radical interpretations to bring about social change. Connection to the Ummah was powerfully evoked by most respondents. It was argued that due to the failure of the international community to put a stop to the various crises within the Muslim world results in some feeling the need to intervene directly, using the Western systems of media communication technologies to help inflict devastation on communities in the West, including on fellow Muslims regarded as apostates. There was a strong sense of frustration directed at the media and governments that apparently airbrush over the causes of violent political radicalism, and then blame the religion rather than the actual political issues which create this response in the first instance. It was said by a young man, who typified the general response: I just get so angry when the media and government go on and on about extremism and how Muslims are always in the wrong . . . they attack our Muslim brothers and sisters, of course you’re going to get a reaction . . . if you oppress a community for so long, you will inevitably get a reaction. (Majid, Bengali (Sylheti), young man, aged 19) These issues were further expanded by another young South Asian Muslim man, who contested: Look at the conflict that has been going on in Palestine for years . . . thousands of Muslims are getting killed there unjustly, but everyone is just sitting back letting it happen . . . no wonder the guys on July 7 did what they did. There is no way that July 7 would have happened if there were no injustices happening in the Muslim world . . . Social Identities 127 Israel gets away with it because of the support of the West. (Ali, Indian (Gujarati), young man, aged 23) One theme that stood out most in interviews, especially from the younger men and women, was the issue of racism in its many varying forms. Respondents expressed that they were made to feel that they do not fully belong to Britain because of their commitments to Islam. It was explained that the widespread prejudice and deep reluctance to accept Muslims was not only because of their South Asian origin, but it was also rooted in ideas about the religion, in which Islam is talked about in explicitly xenophobic terms. One respondent said: Muslims are viewed . . . in a very negative way because people see them following a religion, which is often portrayed as very evil and backwards. (Saima, Pakistani (Kashmiri), young woman, university student, aged 21) Downloaded by [Fatin University] at 00:57 18 May 2012 Others expressed the concerns that the continuous negative labelling of Muslims has the potential to further radicalise sections of the Muslim community: some sections of society just want to work against what the government wants, and see in these labels exactly what will piss them off. (Abbas, Indian (Uttar Pradesh), young man, University student, aged 20) Radicalism is clearly the outcome of a multiplicity of factors. The ‘war on terror’ as well other international issues currently being experienced in Muslim lands has the potential to radicalise certain Muslims inside of Britain. However, this cannot be isolated from factors of exclusion, anti-Islamism and discrimination that large segments of British South Asian Muslims continue to face, with certain media and political discourses that continue to uncritically support the Islamophobic hegemony (Abbas, 2007). There is a general societal assumption that radicalisation is a function of the religion of Islam (Gove, 2006; Phillips, 2007), rather than issues relating to power, vilification, alienation and Islamophobia, as well as the international scene. Young Muslims are not always able to find a ‘middle path’ because they lack the opportunities or structures within the community (and without). Radical political groups are able to capture the imaginations of disaffected Muslim youths when these preconditions permeate individual and collective identities. Leading the way ahead In specific relation to Muslims in politics, while participation has increased in the last twenty years, representation, however, has been limited. Hopkins and KahaniHopkins (2004) looked at the ways in which Islamic discourse is used to both support and discourage participation in the electoral process. For instance, Al-Muhajiroun argued that voting for Muslims is prohibited, but the response to this by the imams and mosques in general is that it is indeed a duty for Muslims to participate in the political and electoral process. In reality, there are only eight South Asian Muslims out of 650 Members of Parliament in the House of Commons (since the General Election of May 2010). Anwar (2001) found from an attitudinal survey that two thirds of respondents felt that Muslims lacked a sufficient voice in the political process. Muslim participation 128 T. Abbas & A. Siddique Downloaded by [Fatin University] at 00:57 18 May 2012 in politics has, however, acquired new significance due to issues such as Iraq. The invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan led to alienation from the Labour Party, whom South Asian Muslims traditionally supported in numbers. Indeed, many Muslims are disillusioned with the attitudes of the political parties in relation to Muslim matters in general, with some regarding them as ‘tokenistic’, of ‘little support for Muslims’, ‘feeling badly let down’ and ‘a lot of talk but little action’ (Anwar, 2005). It has resulted in more Muslims participating in mainstream politics, with some members of the community functioning as a coherent force in national politics, voicing demands in the name of Muslims and non-Muslims as a whole. This alliance has become proficient at entering into mainstream politics, as shown by the ways in which Muslims joined the anti-war coalition, helping to inflict defeat on the Labour Party in Brent East in September 2003 and in Bethnal Green and Bow in 2005 (Phillips, 2008). In interviewing politicians and spiritual leaders, questions regarding the Muslim community and their role within society were of particular significance. Since 7/7, criticisms have been directed at the Muslim community from sections of the government and media, in particular for not tackling some of the problems facing young Muslims. All the respondents in the study, however, expressed constructive criticism of their own community, while also providing practical solutions to the range of issues and problems encountered. It was felt that because of the current climate, there was a greater demand for ‘the community’ to function as a coherent force. Some indicated that the Muslim communities of Britain needed to try harder to combat the problems, but felt that this was not something that Muslims should be responsible for on their own, such that the state must also take a much more active role in addressing these concerns and issues. Clearly, this Muslim community has felt a sense of separation from mainstream political parties and this is one of the reasons why the numbers becoming involved in radical politics are increasing. The events of 7/7 were an important catalyst in mobilising the next generation of leaders. A leading political figure stated: When it comes to representation in government, of course Muslims are not represented adequately . . . When you look at parliament we have four members in Parliament [before the General Election of 2010] whereas we should be having more than twenty, but the numbers are increasing in terms of getting involved in politics, and speaking out for the whole community. (Yasmina, Pakistani (Punjabi), community leader, aged 35) This observation coheres with the research conducted by Anwar (2001), which suggests that Muslims are feeling let down by the major political parties, and are therefore taking a much more direct stance themselves. Many respondents in the study made active references to a civil rights campaigner, Salma Yaqoob, a Muslim woman councillor, who has helped to upset the existing ‘biraderi’ (patrilineal clan-kinship networks) political systems that have operated in Birmingham and in other parts of the country in the post-war decades (see Back & Solomos, 1992), and, because of it, encouraged a new generation of political leaders, many of whom are Muslim young men and women. However, spiritual leaders pointed to the lack of unity within the Muslim community; which is also a result of the same ‘biraderi’ system, thus hindering the progression of the Muslim community more widely. While Islam prohibits discriminatory divisions based on social status or ethnicity, it was Social Identities 129 admitted that this is unfortunately the norm, as the reality reveals deep divisions among Muslim ethnic groups. A young man captured the general sentiment: Some mosques talk about divisions not unity . . . when you go to mosque they ask you what sect do you associate with, Barelwis, Deobandis and that confuses you . . . and that does not attract British-born Muslims . . . because they are talking about divisions rather than brotherhood, and they fail to look at how we can combat the political issues that Muslims are at the centre of. (Sulaiman, Pakistani (Kashmiri), young man, aged 19) Downloaded by [Fatin University] at 00:57 18 May 2012 One politician argued that there was an inability among many spiritual leaders to reach out and engage with the Muslim and non-Muslim community, largely because of language difficulties and cultural sensibilities. It can lead to youngsters being drawn towards more radical and extremist messages, found easily in the English language, with the Internet playing a particular role in this regard (Bunt, 2006). A spiritual leader stated: The problem they face is that by and large in mosques they are not getting the intellectually rigorous sort of Islamic awareness as they would require, and that is what is causing them to perhaps feel alienated . . . and [they] fall into the clutches of extremist elements, who can intellectually engage with them . . . and can perhaps indoctrinate them to their interpretation of Islam. (Said, Pakistani (Punjabi), spiritual leader, aged 42) It appears that the ‘inward-looking’ politics of the older generations, together with the inflexibility of mosques, imams and Islamic centres have potentially made Muslim youngsters even more alienated and excluded in a society in which they are facing many difficult challenges. Political figures argue that the way forward for the Muslim community is to directly reach out to the Muslim youth. One particular area in which this could be achieved is through the mosques, in which conditions could be improved: We need to improve the conditions of imams, their communication skills, the governance of our mosques, the capacity of our mosques and imams, we need to promote good sensible democratic leadership within our communities and get rid of this ‘biraderi’ domination or sectarianism . . . Something does need to be examined and this is what we are trying to do, trying to bring professional people together, religious scholars, and opinion makers to have a sort of SWOT analysis to look at the strength of our community, the weaknesses, the opportunities we have, distortion and misrepresentation, and to identify the elements we can look at ways in which we can tackle them . . . that’s something that we need to do as a matter of urgency. (Abdullah, Pakistani (Kashmiri), political figure, aged 56) Spiritual leaders suggested that it was important to engage with youngsters and to bring the ‘correct’ form of Islamic teaching into the mosques, particularly from the perspectives of well-respected religious scholars: I think that mosques need to try to influence youngsters to listen to religious scholars like Sheikh Hamza Yusuf and a number of [other] Western scholars. They try to provide a correct understanding of the physical Jihad, but also the spiritual Jihad or ‘Jihad-annafs’ (the struggle against the ego) and through this young people will find some solace and patience. (Yahya, Pakistani (Kashmiri), imam, aged 38) 130 T. Abbas & A. Siddique Downloaded by [Fatin University] at 00:57 18 May 2012 All these factors can improve the leadership of the Muslim community, potentially helping to de-radicalise violent behaviour, but it was suggested that issues related to radicalisation cannot be isolated from wider factors of foreign policy, anti-terror legislation, socio-economic exclusion and the demonisation of Islam in the media, together with the failure of the international community to intervene in relation to the suffering experienced by Muslims across the world. These were a set of themes consistently revisited by respondents in relation to issues of leadership and the ways forward for the community. Positive factors included getting young people involved in politics and encouraging a wider and deeper appreciation of Islam to build confidence and engagement, and ultimately role models for other younger Muslims. However, there were also criticisms directed at the mosque elders for being unable to connect with young people. They were not always valuing their needs and interests, in having closed institutional structures based on a perpetual need to socially and culturally reproduce themselves. It was felt crucial that mosques take an important lead in bridging relations between and within Muslims and nonMuslims (Lewis, 2007). Concluding thoughts The original aims of this study were to explore and analyse the impact of the events of 7/7 from the perspectives of South Asian Muslims in a city in the West Midlands, UK, exploring matters relating to radicalisation and de-radicalisation. Given that this study focused on a number of fields, the samples and observations needed to reflect this emphasis. Therefore, interviews were carried out with young men and women (aged 18Á25), including university students, together with spiritual leaders, community activists, youth workers and prominent political leaders. There were obvious differences in attitude, opinion and perception based on differences in social class, ethnicity and gender, but many responses in relation to the experiences of Muslims in the post-7/7 climate were universal in nature and orientation. One of the interesting findings in this study was how some young Muslims were using physical appearance as a resistance strategy against anti-Muslim rhetoric, usually expressed through young Muslim women wearing the Hijab and with men growing beards and wearing caps. Rather than heading towards a more violent ideology, these young Muslims were apparently experiencing a cultural identity shift that is more esoteric, conceivably reflecting a ‘softer’ vs. a ‘harder’ radicalism. Both genders saw themselves as British, but specifically ‘British Muslims’. However, some expressed that they were not always made to feel British. Questions relating to integration and their relationship with wider non-Muslim communities suggested that this was a function of local area social and economic opportunities in general. This finding, however, does not cohere with existing dominant government thinking or the persuasions of centre-right think tanks, commentators and political leaders in general (Kundnani, 2008). That is, official reports have tended to suggest that there has been a problem with the Muslim integration process due to cultural divisions. Or, reflected in the ways in which the idea of multiculturalism, ‘a philosopher’s tool’ in relation to imagining the ‘good society’, has received extensive criticism, for the left and the right (Kepel, 2008; Malik, 2008). In reality, a lack of integration is more a function of economics and questions of social and political empowerment rather than identity, culture or Social Identities 131 religion alone (Bhavani, Mirza, & Meetoo, 2005; Jayaweera & Choudhury, 2008; Bagguley & Hussain, 2008). The negative effects of local and global events have the potential to attract young people to extremist organisations that provide succour in the face of a range of internal and external pressures. This is reasonably well-documented in current commentary. However, none of the young South Asian Muslim respondents felt that organisations such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir directly represent them or their views, but there was an understanding why young people may be drawn to their messages. Some of the young Muslims argued that this was largely because they are able to provide unity in the face of racism and exclusion, together with an alternative to the traditional Muslim leadership, which is thought to be inflexible and stagnated. Aspects of the spiritual leadership within the Muslim community is said to be unyielding, unable to respond to the demands of the youth. A language and cultural barrier often exists as most imams, who often do not speak English, are unable to address how British Muslims should meet the challenges currently facing them. This, unfortunately, leads to some young people being drawn towards extremist bodies that can easily provide this support. Because of issues of capacity and professionalisation, most mosques are unable to offer an open perspective on theology for younger generations wanting a more literal interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah, which extremist groups are subsequently able to exploit elsewhere. It was argued that there needs to be the encouragement to follow certain influential Islamic scholars that are able to provide progressive Islamic teachings on all aspects of jihad (the ‘struggle’ for Islam), with a clear emphasis on the spiritual. Similarly, the physical conditions of mosques and imams need to be improved to ensure this effective integration process. It was also generally felt that it is important for Muslims to become involved in mainstream politics. Political and spiritual leaders argued that the solutions to the latter, as with all the other social problems Muslims in general experience, are based on local-area remedies that engender positive integration, confidence, trust and participation. This is to be created from the ‘bottom-up’ rather than through a wholly ‘top-down’ political rhetoric that seeks to work towards ‘moderating’ Muslims based on an enforced nationalistic mono-culturalist approach to a socio-cultural incorporation of ethnic and religious minorities. Since carrying out this research, the ‘Prevent’ anti-terrorism agenda has come under considerable community and political criticism. In the present context of a Conservative-Democrat coalition, and with the impact of public sector cuts in relation to public finances in the wake of the global credit crisis of late 2008, many community projects are likely to be scaled down, and before their true impact may have been realised. Prime Minister David Cameron’s speech on anti-terrorism, security and multiculturalism delivered on 5 February 2011 in Munich caused considerable outcry among certain left-of-centre academics and commentators. At an event designed to discuss terrorism and security issues, the David Cameron took the opportunity to make his first public statement on the question of radical Islamism and its dangers for secular liberal nations such as Britain. The essential argument being made was that the problem is one of radical Islamism and that Britain can no longer tolerate the intolerable Á that is, apparently divisive communitarian ethno-political interests. The speech caused considerable response from many sectors of society. After the tragic events of 7/7, potentially genuine Downloaded by [Fatin University] at 00:57 18 May 2012 132 T. Abbas & A. Siddique Downloaded by [Fatin University] at 00:57 18 May 2012 efforts made by civil servants and community groups to capacity-build and develop resilience on the ground, in particular in relation to young people and women, will be seen as projects not worth pursing any further. Moreover, categorising the range of Islamisms as a function of Islam ignores everything in the making of Islamism which is that it is a political project. A firm association between assimilationist goals and the determination of a security state is a potentially problematic move in relation to unity with diversity, civil liberties and, potentially, human rights, for all. Britain is what it is because it is a multi-ethnic society and it has been for quite some time (although far from a perfect one). The findings in this paper are based on a small-scale ethnographic social research project, based on qualitative interviewing and observational methods in the postindustrial globalising city of Birmingham, UK. It is possible to know a great deal about Muslims and Islam since events the 9/11 because of the burgeoning academic, policy-maker and social discourses that are printed in the forms of scholarly dissertations, ‘insider accounts’, opinion-editorials and media punditry, but precise and analytically-independent grounded empirical research remains limited. Important insights in relation to the perceptions and attitudes of British South Asian Muslims in the post-7/7 climate have been in this study. The debates in relation to migration, integration, multiculturalism and radicalism are at the centre of much public concern, with Muslims projected as the bete noire of British society today. The ˆ findings in this study provide a much needed perspective on South Asian Muslim communities who are under sharp focus but are little able to speak for themselves. 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